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RECENT DEVELOPMENT IN
NEW YORK LAW
THE EFFECT OF PEOPLE V. VERNACE ON A
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS AND A SPEEDY TRIAL IN NEW
YORK
STEVEN J. STONITSCHt
INTRODUCTION
In 1978, the New York Court of Appeals announced that it
had never drawn a fine distinction between due process' and
speedy trial2 standards.3 Rather, "an untimely prosecution may
be subject to dismissal even though, in the interim, the
defendant was not formally accused, restrained or incarcerated
for the offense."4 To determine a violation of either right, the
t J.D. Candidate, June 2003, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., May
2000, Bucknell University.
I Claims of prejudice involving pre-indictment delays are governed by the Due
Process clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Generally, the United States Supreme
Court has held that delays in bringing a defendant to trial may violate his right to a
fair trial; however, the Court has found the Statute of Limitations to be the primary
safeguard in this area. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-26 (1971).
2 A defendant's right to a speedy trial is intended to protect the accused from
"undue and oppressive incarceration prior to trial" and "to minimize anxiety and
concern accompanying public accusation." Marion, 404 U.S. at 320 (quoting United
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).
3 People v. Singer, 376 N.E.2d 179, 186 (N.Y. 1978).
4 Id.; see People v. Staley, 364 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (N.Y. 1977) (stating that
charges must be dismissed when there is a long enough delay, regardless of whether
the defendant's ability to present a defense has been prejudiced); People v. Winfrey,
228 N.E.2d 808, 812 (N.Y. 1967) (holding that once a criminal proceeding is
initiated, the prosecution has an obligation to prosecute without unreasonable
delay); People v. Wilson, 171 N.E.2d 310, 313 (N.Y. 1960) (holding that after the
indictment, the defendant has the right to commencement of the trial without
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court of appeals developed a balancing test that has been
consistently reaffirmed in subsequent cases.5 The balancing test
consists of five factors set forth in People v. Taranovich:
(1) the extent of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the
nature of the underlying charge; (4) whether or not there has
been an extended period of pretrial incarceration; and (5)
whether or not there is any indication that the defense has
been impaired by reason of the delay.6
While these factors may appear clear on their face, dispute
has arisen as to whether a defendant is required to make a
showing of "actual prejudice" for a dismissal to be granted. 7 In
addition, issues concerning what constitutes a "reasonable" delay
created by the district attorney8 and how the "nature of the
underlying charge" factors into the overall balancing test 9
undue delay).
5 See People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 2001); Singer, 376 N.E.2d at
185; People v. Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. 1975).
6 Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d at 306.
7 See Singer, 376 N.E.2d at 186-87 (indicating that the defendant may be
entitled to dismissal without a showing of actual prejudice); Staley, 364 N.E.2d at
1113-14 (allowing the dismissal of an indictment, in the absence of actual prejudice
to the defendant, because of an unreasonable delay).
8 See People v. Lesiuk, 617 N.E.2d 1047, 1050 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that a delay
of eight months between incident and arrest was permissible in a narcotics case
where an undercover officer would have been jeopardized if defendant had been
arrested earlier); Singer, 376 N.E.2d at 187 (holding that a three-year delay in
arresting the defendant, because police were waiting for him to get released from an
out of state prison, was not an acceptable reason for delay in prosecution); People v.
Jones, 699 N.Y.S.2d 447, 447-48 (2d Dep't 1999) (holding that the delay in
indictment was justified because it was due to time spent attempting to locate the
defendant); People v. LaRocca, 568 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (2d Dep't 1991) (holding that
the delay in indictment between 1978 and 1984 was justified given that a potential
witness was unavailable to local authorities because he was being debriefed by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation); People v. Bryant, 411 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (2d Dep't
1978) (holding that an almost seven-month delay prior to indictment was
permissible in a narcotics case where a premature indictment would have
jeopardized a confidential informant as well as a larger investigation).
9 See People v. Johnson, 342 N.E.2d 525, 529-30 (N.Y. 1975). In Johnson, the
court of appeals clarified its Taranovich holding with respect to the role of the
"nature of the underlying charge" in its balancing test, stating:
[Tihe nature of the crime is relevant because the prosecutor may
understandably be more thorough and precise in his preparation for the
trial of a [serious felony] then [sic] he would be in prosecuting a
misdemeanor. In other words what may be considered an unreasonable
delay in preparing a minor, relatively common street crime for trial may be
tolerable when a serious or complex charge is involved.
Id. at 530. Whether the "nature of the underlying charge" should be looked at for
purposes other than gauging a reasonable time in which a district attorney would be
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remain subject to dispute. In People v. Vernace,10 the New York
Court of Appeals was once again confronted with these issues
and set new precedent that may jeopardize the due process
rights of future criminal defendants.
I. THE FACTS OF PEOPLE V. VERNACE
The events resulting in the Vernace case began on April 11,
1981 at the Shamrock Bar in Richmond Hill, Queens." As
Frank Riccardi and his date were seated together at the bar, a
young man accidentally spilled his drink upon the woman's
dress. 12  Frank Riccardi issued a heated response as the
bartender struggled to act as peacemaker. 13 One of the bar's
owners, John D'Agnese, unavailingly tried to settle things down
but was forced to ask Riccardi to leave.14 Before Riccardi left,
however, he threatened: "I will be back!"15 Riccardi did indeed
return some twenty minutes later, with two other men, seeking
vengeance upon D'Agnese.16  After a brief scuffle between
D'Agnese and two of the assailants, the unfortunate bar owner
was shot and fatally wounded by the third assailant. 17
D'Agnese's friend and co-owner of the bar, Richard Godkin, ran
to give assistance, but he also was shot and killed.' 8
The Queens Homicide Squad quickly identified the three
assailants through information provided by the bartender and
Linda Gotti, a patron who witnessed the crimes, as well as
through a follow-up investigation.1 9 The bartender identified the
assailants as "Frankie the Geech," "Ronnie the Jew," and "Pepe."
Through further investigation, the Homicide Squad determined
that "Frankie the Geech" was Frank Riccardi and "Ronnie the
Jew" was Ronnie Barlin. The Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) was able to provide the Queens detectives with "Pepe's"
address and telephone number as well as the name of "Jackie,"
able to prepare a certain type of case remains unclear. See id.
10 756 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y. 2001).
11 Court Decisions, N.Y.L.J., July 16, 1999, at 34.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
Is Id.
19 Id.
2002]
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the woman with whom he lived.20 After reviewing a photograph,
the bartender and Linda Gotti identified "Pepe" as one of the
three men involved in the double murder, and Jacqueline Settles
("Jackie") confirmed that the man in the photograph was in fact
her husband, Robert Vernace. 21 Even given these identifications,
the police and prosecutors seemingly did not pursue Vernace
with the same force as they did Riccardi and Barlin. Despite
similar evidence against all three perpetrators, the Queens
District Attorney only presented cases against Riccardi and
Barlin to a grand jury. In April 1982, indictments were handed
down against Riccardi and Barlin. Riccardi remained at large,
and Barlin was subsequently arrested.22 At a pre-trial hearing
on May 3, 1983, after Linda Gotti recanted her identification of
Barlin and the bartender, who was unable to be found, could no
longer testify, charges against Barlin were dropped.23 The
record showed that the case remained inactive until 1997, when
Detective Thomas Mansfield of the "Cold Case Squad" began
reviewing it.24
Upon review of the case, Detective Mansfield began an
investigation, which included interviewing the recently located
bartender and approximately a dozen other witnesses. After
20 Id.
21 Id. Justice Eng also wrote in his opinion, "Oddly, the surveillance
photographs were never shown to any of the 20-25 other witnesses. It must be
assumed that the police were confident that they possessed probable cause for the
arrest of the defendant based upon the two positive identifications .. " Id. This
finding of fact by Justice Eng is in conflict with the appellate division finding that
"at the time of the shootings there were 20 to 25 patrons present in the tavern,
detectives testified that most of them refused to become involved and denied being
present." People v. Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494 (2d Dep't 2000).
22 Justice Eng, in his Vernace opinion, wrote:
On March 25, 26 and April 2, 1982, the Queens County District
Attorney... presented evidence to the Grand Jury concerning the April
11, 1981 shootings of John D'Agnese and Richard Godkin at the Shamrock
Bar. Some nine witnesses testified, including the bartender, Linda Gotti
and five other patrons of the Shamrock Bar, and a police officer.
Notwithstanding the fact that the bartender had, months before, identified
the third man as "Pepe" and had later positively identified him from the
surveillance photo, this witness was never asked to identify Vernace in the
Grand Jury. This inaction on the part of [the District Attorney] was in
direct contrast to the manner in which the witness was questioned
concerning the other two perpetrators.
Court Decisions, supra note 11, at 34.
23 Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
24 Id.
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conducting these interviews, Mansfield attempted to find the
defendant with the use of motor vehicle records and FBI
photographs. Witnesses who had been present at the incident
were able to identify the defendant from these photographs. Two
of these witnesses identified the defendant as one of the men
responsible for the shooting of Mr. D'Agnese.25
The defendant, Robert Vernace, was subsequently taken
into custody on November 22, 1998 and arraigned two days
later.26 In July of 1999, the New York State Supreme Court
dismissed the indictment against Vernace, finding that the
"grossly unreasonable delay" in prosecuting Vernace amounted
to a denial of his right to due process.27 On appeal the decision
was reversed and the indictment reinstated by the Second
Department of the New York Appellate Division in a three-to-
two opinion dated July 31, 2000.28
II. THE COURTS CONFRONT PEOPLE V. VERNACE
The appellate division found that, given the ruthlessness
and cold-bloodedness of the murders, the prosecutor's decision to
reexamine the case after the witnesses' fears faded was
25 Id. The trial court's opinion describes some disturbing facts not present in
the appellate division's opinion concerning these "new" witness interviews:
On April 28, 1998, a witness in the state of Florida identifies the defendant
from the night of the shooting. On the next day, a second witness, also
residing in Florida, again identifies the defendant from the photo array.
This witness had originally identified the defendant from the Bottari
surveillance photo on October 8, 1981. Now Detective Mansfield has two
positive identifications of the defendant and is poised to prepare the case
for the Grand Jury. What must be disturbing to the detective is that the
"new witness" also testified in the first Grand Jury, but was never asked to
identify the defendant. In fact, according to the testimony at the Singer
hearing he was never shown the surveillance photo during the initial
investigation.
Court Decisions, supra note 11, at 34.
26 Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
27 Court Decisions, supra note 11, at 34. Justice Eng further wrote:
Regardless of whether or not Robert Vernace was present in the Shamrock
Bar during the early morning hours of April 11, 1981, there was competent
evidence known to the police and the District Attorney, relatively soon
after the crime, to have permitted reasonable men and women to indict the
defendant for the D'Agnese-Godkin murders in 1982. For reasons not
adequately brought forth at the Singer hearing, a decision not to prosecute
the defendant was made within the then prosecutor's office.
Id.
28 Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
20021
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reasonable. 29 The court accepted the testimony of detectives who
contended that, although there were twenty to twenty-five
people in the bar during the shooting, most of the patrons did not
cooperate and denied being present.30 In addition, while noting
the loss of the .38 caliber revolver linked to the crime as well as
the loss of several police reports, the appellate division found
that far from prejudicing the defendant, these events rendered
the People's prosecution of Vernace more difficult. 31  The
appellate court noted that unspecified claims of potential
prejudice do not constitute actual prejudice. 32 Furthermore, the
prosecutor did not deliberately extend the length of inactivity in
this case in order to gain any unfair advantage. 33
The court of appeals, in a memorandum opinion, agreed with
the appellate division's findings of fact and law.34 While the
court acknowledged that the delay in indictment had been
extensive, it found that the four other factors of the Taranovich
balancing test favored the prosecution. 35 The court clearly noted
the seriousness of the charge and specifically pointed out the fact
that it occurred over a spilled drink.36 The appellate division
previously stated that the double homicide reflected "a particular
callousness toward human life."37 The court of appeals further
found that the defense had not been impaired and that instead of
giving the prosecutor any unfair advantage, the delay actually
rendered proving the case against Vernace more difficult.38
Finally, the court held that the decision to delay Vernace's
prosecution was made in good faith and for sufficient reasons
and, therefore, did not constitute a violation of due process. 39
Judge Levine of the New York Court of Appeals wrote a
strong dissent in Vernace. He stressed the fact that Vernace had
been identified early on in the investigation and that police had
known his whereabouts. 40 In addition, given the fact that all
29 Id. at 494.
30 Id.
31 See id. at 495.
32 See id.
33 See id.
34 See People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 67 (N.Y. 2001).
35 See id. at 67-68.
36 See id. at 67.
37 Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
3s See Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 67.
39 See id. at 67-68.
40 See id. at 68 (Levine, J., dissenting).
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three assailants had been identified by the, bartender, the
dissent argued that "the evidence against [the] defendant at [the
time of the grand jury investigation] was indistinguishable from
that against Riccardi and only differed from [that against Barlin]
in the respect that Barlin was the only one of the three suspects
arrested" and then identified in a lineup by Linda Gotti.
41
Furthermore, the dissent pointed out that the prosecutor decided
to bring murder charges before the grand jury only against
Riccardi and Barlin, for reasons that were not revealed at the
Singer hearing.42 The dissenting opinion focused on the total
lack of action by the prosecutor and by law enforcement for
fourteen years. Judge Levine stated that "we view an
unjustified, protracted pre-indictment delay in prosecution, even
one far shorter than 14 years, as a deprivation of a defendant's
State constitutional right to due process, without requiring a
showing of actual prejudice." 43 The dissent found the argument
that delay was reasonable in light of witness fear and reluctance
to testify devoid of evidentiary support given that, among other
things, the prosecution of Riccardi and Barlin went forward with
the same evidence and lack of witness cooperation. 44 Rather,
Judge Levine argued that the "evidence points only to complete
prosecutorial inertia and inattention, as reflected in the loss by
the district attorney's office of both a gun fired during the
homicides and the complete original file [for the case]. 45
III. ANALYSIS OF THE RULING IN PEOPLE V. VERNACE
In past cases, New York courts that have rejected claims of
violations of due process or the right to a speedy trial have relied
on very specific and limited-in-scope justifications for such
delay.46 In People v. Lesiuk47 and People v. Bryant,48 delays
41 Id. (Levine, J., dissenting).
42 Id. (Levine, J., dissenting). At a Singer hearing, the prosecutor must show
good cause for a delay between arrest and prosecution for a crime. See N.Y. v.
Singer, 44 376 N.E.2d 179, 186-87 (N.Y. 1978)
43 Id. at 69 (Levine, J., dissenting).
44 See id. (Levine, J., dissenting).
'45 Id. at 69-70 (Levine, J., dissenting).
'16 See People v. Johnson, 342 N.E.2d 525, 530-31 (N.Y. 1975).
47 617 N.E.2d 1047, 1049-50 (N.Y. 1993) (holding that there was no "reasonable
probability" that the outcome would have been different were it not for the delay,
and, therefore, the delay was immaterial).
48 411 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (2d Dep't 1978) (stating that the district attorney
determines the timing of a criminal prosecution and the police department dictates
20021
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necessary to protect undercover officers or confidential
informants were held permissible when the defendants were
indicted in a narcotics case immediately after the conclusion of
the overall investigation. 49 The appellate division excused a six-
year pre-indictment delay in People v. Suero,50 in which the
police department was found to be "reasonably diligent" in
finding the murder suspect and there was "no indication of bad
faith by law enforcement or specific prejudice to [the]
defendant."51 Finally, in People v. LaRocca,5 2 a six-year pre-
indictment delay in a murder case was found to be justified when
a potential witness was unavailable to local authorities because
he was being debriefed by the FBI.53
All of these justifications for pre-indictment delays are very
specific in nature and appear to be limited in scope since they do
not go on indefinitely. Either a larger investigation ends, a
witness is made available by the federal authorities, or, after a
continued and "reasonably diligent" search, a defendant is found.
It seems that all of these justifications are the product of rational
decision-making at the commencement of the delay, rather than
excuses made in hindsight. In his dissent, Judge Levine seized
on this issue when he stated:
Even if... the majority is correct in holding that there is some
evidence of witnesses' fear or reluctance to testify which would
support the Appellate Division's finding that the prosecution
had good cause not to seek the indictment of defendant in
1982-1983, there is absolutely no support in the record and not
even a finding by the Appellate Division, that a conscious
decision was made, based upon the recalcitrance of witnesses,
to defer prosecution of defendant for the next 14 years.54
The delay in Vernace was not the product of a "conscious
decision" and it also was considerably longer than the delays in
the cases previously mentioned. In addition, the first time that
the timing of a police investigation).
49 Lesiuk, 617 N.E.2d at 1050; Bryant, 411 N.Y.S.2d at 936.
50 654 N.Y.S.2d 114, 115 (1st Dep't 1997) (holding that since there was neither
bad faith exhibited by the law enforcement nor specific prejudice to the defendant,
the delay was permissible).
51 Id.
52 568 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (2d Dep't 1991) (concluding that the seventeen-year
delay did not deprive the defendants of his due process rights).
53 Id. at 431-32.
54 People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 69 (N.Y. 2001) (Levine, J., dissenting).
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any evidence of witness' fear or recalcitrance became apparent
occurred months after the district attorney had declined to
proceed against Vernace before a grand jury.55 The justification
offered in the Vernace case is also considerably more vague than
the reasons previously accepted by New York courts. The court
of appeals simply wrote that "[wlhile 20 to 25 people allegedly
were in the bar at the time of the murders, virtually all of them
denied seeing the crime."56 This is a stronger statement than
that which was made by the appellate division, which announced
that "most" of the witnesses would not cooperate. 57 Why the
court of appeals found this justification so convincing is unclear
given that: (1) it was not the product of a "conscious decision," (2)
it was fairly vague considering past justifications accepted by the
court, (3) it was not pursued for fourteen years, and (4) it was
only taken up again due to a "Cold Case" detective stumbling
upon it. 58
The "nature of the underlying charge" in this case raises
questions about the policy considerations underlying the
inclusion of this factor in the Taranovich balancing test and how
the factor is to be weighed in that test. It appears that in
Vernace the appellate division was concerned with the "inherent
seriousness of homicide" as well as the "State's concurrent
interest in seeking justice for such a crime" when evaluating this
factor.59 The appellate division "repeatedly emphasized the
'particularly heinous' nature of the charges in considering
whether Mr. Vernace's speedy-trial right [or due process right
was] being abused."60 Similarly, the court of appeals spoke of the
"vicious" nature of the crime.61 While these statements may be
true, it is difficult to see why they justify inaction in a murder
case but not in a case involving a lesser criminal charge. It
appears that none of these concerns have anything to do with
55 Indictments against Riccardi and Barlin were handed down in April of 1982;
Linda Gotti recanted her testimony in March of 1983. Therefore, it is still not
apparent why an indictment against Vernace was not sought at the same time
indictments were obtained against Riccardi and Barlin. See supra notes 23-24 and
accompanying text.
56 Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 67.
57 See People v. Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d 492,494 (2d Dep't 2000).
58 Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 69-70 (Levine, J., dissenting).
59 Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 493.
5o Michael A. Riccardi, Split Panel Allows Prosecution of Murder Suspect After
17 Years, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4, 2000, at 1.
65 Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 67.
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such lengthy delays. In fact, when the Taranovich test was first
developed, the court announced the rationale of looking to the
"nature of the underlying charge" by stating that a "prosecutor
may understandably be more thorough and precise in his
preparation for trial of a class C felony than he would be in
prosecuting a misdemeanor."62 The Taranovich court was quick
to mention that "this is not to say that one's right to a speedy
trial is dependent upon what one is charged with."63 In People v.
Johnson,64 the court of appeals even went so far as to call this
factor "of little significance" where the preparation of the case for
trial "contributed very little, if anything, to the overall delay."65
In Vernace, it seems that the fourteen-year period of inaction by
prosecutors and law enforcement had nothing to do with the
inherent complexity of such a serious crime.66 In fact, it does not
seem that any new investigation was conducted or new evidence
produced.67 The court spends no time discussing the complexity
of the investigation or the complexity of the crime in defending
the need for delays. Therefore, it appears that after Vernace, the
court of appeals is more likely to allow the "nature of the
underlying charge" to play a more dominant role in the
balancing test when a defendant has been charged with murder,
62 People v. Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d 303, 306 (N.Y. 1975). The New York Court
of Appeals stated:
Appellant was arrested for attempted murder, a class B felony, and
indicted for assault in the first degree, a class C felony. Upon such a
serious charge, the District Attorney may be expected to proceed with far
more caution and deliberation than he would expend on a relatively minor
offense.
Id.
63 Id.
64 342 N.E.2d 525, 531 (N.Y. 1975) (reversing a conviction and dismissing a
manslaughter indictment because defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial
had been violated).
G5 Id. at 530.
66 In fact, the appellate division describes how once Detective Mansfield of the
"Cold Case Squad" reviewed the case in 1997, things came together in relatively
short order. As the court described, "Mansfield interviewed the bartender, who had
again been located, and 10 to 12 other people who were present at the time of the
shootings." People v. Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d 492, 494 (2d Dep't 2000). Vernace was
then identified and located in a relatively short period of time. Id. at 495.
67 Rather than finding any new evidence, law enforcement and the district
attorney's office seemed considerably more proficient at losing evidence over this
period of delay. The appellate division freely conceded that a .38 caliber revolver,
which had been linked to the murders, as well as several police reports were
missing. See id. at 495.
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particularly a sensational murder.
The court of appeals, in Vernace, found that the defendant
was not deprived of his right to due process based on the delay,
even if there were "some" prejudice to the defendant. 68 Both the
court of appeals and the appellate division pointed out the
difficulties the prosecution faced in light of lost evidence and a
fourteen-year hiatus. 69 The appellate division even went so far
as to state that "[clontrary to the defendant's claim, the delay in
this case places the prosecution, not the [defense], at a tactical
disadvantage, because the delay may have served to erode the
memories of the eyewitnesses."70 Seemingly, this statement
implies that if the eyewitnesses do retain their memory, they
will most certainly implicate the defendant. In any event, the
appellate division held that "[u]nspecified claims that witnesses
may have moved, or forgotten relevant material that those
[police] reports may have contained, do not constitute actual
prejudice."71
This holding, with respect to actual prejudice, was affirmed
by the court of appeals even though it appears to represent a
departure from prior case law.72  In Taranovich, the court of
appeals held:
[Ihf the delay precipitated by the 'rosecution resulted in the
defendant's being unable to call certain witnesses, or if the
duration of the delay was such that it might be expected that
the witnesses would be less able to articulate exactly what had
transpired, then the defendant would have a strong argument
for dismissal of the indictment. 73
Apparently, this once strong argument has grown
considerably weaker. Whereas the court in Taranovich talked
about a delay that "might" result in a hazy memory, the
appellate division and the court of appeals in Vernace wanted
specifics. This is an even greater departure from the court of
appeals' opinion in Taranovich in which it held that "where in
the circumstances delay is great enough there need be neither
proof nor fact of prejudice to the defendant."74 Furthermore, the
68 See People v. Vernace, 756 N.E.2d 66, 68 (N.Y. 2001).
69 See id. at 68; see also Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 496 (Florio, J., dissenting).
70 Vernace, 711 N.Y.S.2d at 495.
71 Id.
72 See Vernace, 756 N.E.2d at 67-68.
73 People v. Taranovich, 335 N.E.2d 303, 307 (N.Y. 1975).
74 Id.
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court seems to have abandoned a policy statement it referred to
in Johnson, which stated that the due process and speedy trial
protection prevents a defendant "from being 'exposed to the
hazard of a trial, after so great a lapse of time' that 'the means of
proving his innocence may not be within his reach'--as for
instance, by the loss of witnesses, or the dulling of memory."75
Given the loss of the gun and police reports, as well as the
dulling of memories, violations of these protections seem likely to
have occurred in Vernace.
CONCLUSION
While bringing an alleged murderer to trial after so many
years may seem to be a triumph, the reality is that a criminal
defendant's right to due process may have been put in jeopardy
by the New York Court of Appeals' ruling in Vernace. No matter
the legitimacy of any justification offered by law enforcement or
the district attorney's office-and there are, no doubt, questions
about this legitimacy-it is undisputed that for fourteen years
the investigation and potential prosecution of Robert Vernace
was completely dormant. The rationale applied by both the
appellate division and the court of appeals in Vernace represents
a departure from prior case law that decreases a murder
defendant's due process protection. First, the court of appeals
accepted a justification for the delay that is vague and open-
ended with almost no limit on how long law enforcement or the
district attorney can wait before attempting to bring an
indictment. Second, the appellate division and the court of
appeals emphasized the sensational and inflammatory nature of
the crime. This is a departure from prior cases that looked to the
"nature of the underlying crime" to determine how long a
prosecutor would reasonably spend investigating it. Instead of
looking to the relative complexity of the crime, the court of
appeals looked to the vicious nature of it. Finally, the appellate
division and the court of appeals departed from prior cases in
requiring the defendant to show "specific" prejudice, even after
such an extensive delay that was not caused by the defendant.
Once again, while it may be comforting that law
enforcement re-visited this case after fourteen years, it is clearly
75 People v. Johnson, 342 N.E.2d 525, 528-29 (N.Y. 1975) (quoting People v.
Prosser, 130 N.E.2d 891, 893 (N.Y. 1955)).
[Vol.76:657
2002] PEOPLE V. VERNACE 669
discomforting that it was not addressed properly sooner. The
court of appeals was too lenient in allowing prosecutors to go
forward with this trial in light of these factors. In order to bring
a murderer to justice, the court of appeals has sacrificed the due
process rights of criminal defendants.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
